Exclusive dealing
Legislation | Prohibited conduct | Authorisation | Cases | History | Reports | Reading
Overview
Section 47 of the CCA prohibits various forms of exclusive dealing. Broadly, it captures two types of anti-competitive vertical transactions:
(1) the conditional supply (or acquisition) of goods or services (conditions may relate to the ability to re-supply, exclusivity, limits on ability to acquire from competitors etc)
(2) refusing to supply for specified reasons (eg, because purchaser refuses to agree to a conditional supply).
Exclusive dealing is captured only if it can be demonstrated that it substantially lessens competition (s 47(10)). Note that prior to November 2017 third line forcing was prohibited per se.
Future reform? Given the potential overlap between the new section 46 (introducing an effects test for misuse of market power) and anti-competitive agreements generally, the Harper Panel (2014) recommended repealing s 47 altogether; although this recommendation was not rejected (the Government indicated it would consider it after determining whether to modify s 46) there has been no modification or repeal of s 47 as part of the Harper legislative reforms, other than the removal of the per se ban on third line forcing.
Legislation
Prohibited conduct
Specific conduct captured as exclusive dealing includes:
(1) Supplying on condition as to acquisition or re-supply (s 47(2)). This captures various forms of full line forcing. Thus, for example, it is exclusive dealing to supply goods or services on the condition that the recipient will not (or will not except to a limited extent) acquire goods or services directly or indirectly from a competitor. It also captures supplying on conditions as to re-supply - including customer and territorial restrictions (eg, supplying on condition that the acquirer will not re-supply to particular person or in particular places)
(2) Refusing to deal because a customer will not agree to the kind of restriction mentioned above: s 47(3).
(3) Acquisitions restrictions (same as above but in reverse): ss 47(4) and 47(5).
(4) Third line forcing (sections 47(6) and 47(7)), capturing the supply of goods or services on condition that the customer acquire other goods or services from a third party (or refusing to supply because the customer will not agree to such an acquisition).
(5) Exclusive dealing in relation to leases and licences: ss 47(8) and 47(9).
Authorisation and notification
Authorisation
Authorisation (on public benefit grounds) is possible for exclusive dealing
Notification
In addition, recognising potential benefits associated with exclusive dealing, a system of notification is available. Because it is faster and essentially reverses the onus of demonstrating public benefits, it is utilised more frequently than authorisation for exclusive dealing conduct (s 93). While the notification stands, parties will not be held in breach of s 47 (see s 47(10A)).
The ACCC can only remove the notification if it is satisfied
(for third line forcing): the likely benefit to the public will not outweigh the likely detriment to the public arising from the proposed conduct (current cost of notification is $100)
Cases
Links to some of the key cases relating to exclusionary provisions in Australia are provided below. Although the provision has been repealed, they remain relevant for section 45 generally and/or the cartel provisions.
Exclusive dealing cases
ACCC v Australasian Food Group [2022] FCA 308
Peters Ice Cream - admitted exclusive dealing - $12million penalty
ACCC v Baxter Healthcare [2007] HCA 38 (29 August 2007) β€
ACCC v Bill Express Ltd (in liq) (2009) 180 FCR 105; [2009] FCA 1022 β
Third line forcing - including 2007 amendments
ACCC v IMB Group Pty Ltd (ACN 050 411 946) (in liq) [2002] FCA 402 β€
Exclusive dealing (third line forcing)
ACCC v Link Solutions Pty Ltd (No 3) [2012] FCA 348 β€
ACCC v Pfizer [2015] FCA; ACCC v Pfizer [2018] FCAFC
Application by Co-operative Bulk Handling Limited (No 3) [2013] ACompT 3 β€
Appeal against revocation of exclusive dealing notification - public benefit v SLC
Australian Association of Pathology Practices Incorporated [2004] ACompT4 β€ (authorisation)
Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd v Williams & Hodgson Transport Pty Ltd [1986] HCA 72; (1986) 162 CLR 395 (2 December 1986) β
Third line forcing
KAM Nominees Pty Ltd v Australian Guarantee Corporation Ltd (1994) 123 ALR 711 β€
Re Ku-ring-gai Co-operative Building Society (No. 12) Ltd [1978] FCA 50; (1978) 36 FLR 134 β€
Exclusive dealing (third line forcing)
Mark Lyons Pty Ltd v Bursill Sportsgear Pty Ltd (1987) 74 ALR 581 β€
O'Brien Glass Industries Ltd v Cool & Sons Pty Ltd (1983) 77 FLR 441; (1983) 48 ALR 625 β€
Outboard Marine Pty Ltd v Hecar Investments (No 6) Pty Ltd (1982) ATPR 40β327 β€
The Paul Dainty Corporation Pty Ltd v The National Tennis Centre Trust [1990] FCA 163; (1990) 22 FCR 495 (LawCite) β€
Exclusive dealing (sub-sections 47(1), (8), (9) and (13))
Stationers Supply Pty Ltd v Victorian Authorised Newsagents Associated Ltd (1993) 44 FCR 35 β
Purpose of substantially lessening competition; exclusive dealing
SWB Family Credit Union Ltd v Parramatta Tourist Services Pty Ltd [1980] FCA 125; (1980) 48 FLR 445 β€
Exclusive dealing (third line forcing)
Trade Practices Commission v Legion Cabs (Trading) Co-operative Society Ltd. [1978] FCA 47; (1978) 35 FLR 372 β€
Exclusive dealing (third line forcing)
Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v ACCC [2003] FCAFC 193 β
Visy Paper Pty Ltd v ACCC [2003] HCA 59 β
Exclusionary provisions; exclusive dealing; anti-overlap
Reports
There have been a number of reports dealing with exclusionary provisions.
Most recently, the Harper Report (2014-2015) β recommended the prohibition be repealed or simplified (depending on changes to be made to the misuse of market power provision.
Previously the Dawson Report 2003 β had recommended the removal of the per se prohibition against third line forcing but although the government intended to make the change, it was eventually removed from the final Dawson reform bill.
See generally the main reports page.
Reading
For research and commentary on exclusive in Australia see the reading room.
See also
Bruce H Kobayashi, 'The Economics of Loyalty Discounts and Antitrust Law in the United States' (2005) 1(115) Competition Policy International (George Mason University School of Law, Law and Economics Working Paper Series, 05-26) (also at SSRN) β€
Last updated: 4 April 2022