Treasury Laws Amendment (Mergers and Acquisitions Reform) Bill 2024
Introduced 10 October 2024 (House)
Third reading agreed (House): 21 November 2024
Introduced 25 November 2024 (Senate)
Third reading agreed (Senate): 28 November 2024
Summary
Overview
The Bill was introduced into the House of Representatives on 10 October 2024.
It passed the House on 21 November 2024
It passed the Senate on 28 November 2024
In brief
Will introduce mandatory suspensory pre-merger notification regime and administrative system for merger assessment (with ACCC as decision-maker, subject to limited merits review to Australian Competition Tribunal
The bill has not been opposed by the opposition and is expected t pass
Details of changes
Substantial changes proposed to the merger law and procedure in Australia.
Will introduce mandatory suspensory pre-merger notification regime and administrative system for merger assessment (with ACCC as decision-maker, subject to limited merits review to Australian Competition Tribunal
The Bill
Bill summary: Amends the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 to replace the existing framework for mergers review with a mandatory and suspensory administrative system for acquisitions, with the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission as the first instance administrative decision-maker. Also makes consequential amendments to 5 Acts.
Explanatory Memorandum
View full EM (below is chapter 1 only)
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1.1 This Bill amends the CCA to overhaul merger review in Australia. The existing framework will be replaced with a mandatory and suspensory administrative system for acquisitions, with the Commission as the first instance administrative decision-maker. Foreign acquisitions will continue to be also subject to the process under the Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act 1975 (FATA).
1.2 A corporation or person that is a party to an acquisition must provide a notification to the Commission if an acquisition is a notifiable transaction, unless the Commission has determined that the acquisition does not require notification. The Commission must undertake an assessment as to whether the acquisition is likely to substantially lessen competition or result in a public benefit. In doing so the Commission must publish details of the acquisition on a public acquisitions register and engage with businesses, stakeholders and the community. The acquisition must not be put into effect unless the Commission has made a determination that it may be put into effect.
1.3 A faster, clearer, streamlined process for the review of acquisitions will enhance efficiency, predictability and transparency. It will strengthen merger control by targeting, through a risk-based system, those mergers most likely to impact Australian consumers if they are anti-competitive.
1.4 By moving to an administrative system, business will benefit from guidance and engagement with the Commission as the expert decision-maker. This will reduce uncertainty and improve predictability. The Commission will undertake an economic and legal, evidence-based assessment of notified acquisitions, improving outcomes for competition and consumers. This will deliver lower prices and improved quality and service for consumers, businesses and the wider community. Importantly, the reforms will meet community expectations that the Commission can detect and stop harmful, anti-competitive acquisitions.
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Australia’s approach to mergers and acquisitions
1.5 Mergers and acquisitions (acquisitions) are important for building a more productive and dynamic economy. They allow businesses to achieve greater economies of scale and to access new resources, technology and expertise.
1.6 While most acquisitions are unlikely to raise competition concerns, some can harm competition, which can lead to businesses increasing prices for consumers and not passing economic gains on to consumers. Australia’s merger control framework plays a crucial gatekeeper role in focusing on preventing the small number of acquisitions that could substantially lessen competition, thereby harming consumers and the wider economy.
1.7 Australia’s current approach to control of mergers and acquisitions prohibits acquisitions that would have the effect, or be likely to have the effect, of substantially lessening competition, assessed through three pathways:
· informal review by the Commission;
· formal merger authorisation by the Commission; and
· Federal Court proceedings related to the acquisition.
1.8 As businesses are not legally required to notify the Commission before completing a transaction, they can also choose to proceed without seeking clearance through one of the three pathways. However, this may put the businesses at risk of the Commission subsequently investigating and taking legal action if it considers the acquisition has the effect or likely effect of substantially lessening competition.
1.9 Informal review, a process which has developed without any legislative framework, enables businesses to manage regulatory risk and seek the Commission’s non-binding view on whether an acquisition is likely to substantially lessen competition.
1.10 Merger authorisation is a formal legislative process which allows the Commission, and the Tribunal on review, to provide businesses with immunity from court action under competition law for a proposed merger or acquisition if it is satisfied that it would not be likely to substantially lessen competition or that it is likely to result in a net public benefit.
1.11 Federal Court proceedings are those in which the Commission, parties to the acquisition or third parties can seek orders relating to the acquisition.
The Commission’s informal review process
1.12 Instead of applying for formal authorisation from the Commission, businesses may, to manage regulatory risk, opt to seek an informal view from the Commission on whether an acquisition is likely to breach the prohibition against anti-competitive acquisitions.
1.13 Currently, most transactions are notified to the Commission via this process. Most of these transactions are confidentially informally reviewed by the Commission, which does not permit stakeholder and community engagement. A small proportion are subject to public informal review. For these transactions, the Commission maintains a public register, and has established procedures including, for example, receiving submissions from businesses, consultation with stakeholders, and issuing voluntary and compulsory information requests. However, the informal process is voluntary and not legislated, and the Commission’s view is non-binding.
The Commission’s formal merger authorisation powers
1.14 The Commission may grant authorisation for an acquisition following a voluntary application by the relevant corporation or persons if it is satisfied the acquisition is not likely to substantially lessen competition or if the likely public benefit arising from the transaction outweighs the likely public detriment.
1.15 A formal Commission authorisation provides businesses with immunity from court action under competition law for a proposed transaction.
1.16 The Commission may vary, revoke or substitute merger authorisations. The Commission may also specify conditions in an authorisation, including that the relevant corporate person must give, and comply with, a court enforceable undertaking.
1.17 The Commission must keep a register of applications for merger authorisations and publish the receipt of each application. The Tribunal can review the Commission’s decision to grant, decline to grant, vary or revoke a merger authorisation. The Tribunal’s review of the Commission’s decision is not a rehearing.
1.18 The Tribunal conducts a limited merits review of the Commission’s determinations. The Tribunal can substitute the Commission’s determination for the correct or preferable decision. However, the Tribunal can only generally consider information that was before the Commission and new information not in existence at the time of the Commission’s determination.
1.19 A person must not give the Commission or the Tribunal information that is false or misleading in connection with an application for a merger authorisation.
Federal Court’s consideration of mergers and acquisitions
1.20 The Commission, the Minister, transaction parties, or third parties can seek orders from the Federal Court where there are concerns that an acquisition may contravene the law (that is, it is likely to have the effect of substantially lessening competition).
1.21 The Commission can seek:
· an injunction to restrain the acquisition prior to completion,
· divestiture post-completion,
· an order that the completed acquisition is void where the vendor is involved in a contravention of section 50 of the CCA, and
· penalties.
1.22 Upon application by the Commission, the court may also make orders to disqualify a person from managing corporations under certain circumstances, if such an order is justified.
1.23 A party may also seek a declaration in the Federal Court that an acquisition does not substantially lessen competition. Third parties may seek a declaration, divestiture or damages. In these circumstances, such relief is at the discretion of the Federal Court and the evidentiary burden of proving the case is usually on the party seeking the orders.
1.24 The Commission may also apply to the Federal Court for a range of orders if the Commission considers that the person who gave a court enforceable undertaking has breached any of its terms.
The current approach to merger control is not fit-for-purpose
1.25 On 23 August 2023, the Government announced a Competition Review to provide advice on how to improve competition across the economy, with a focus on reforms that would increase productivity, reduce the cost of living and/or lift wages. In particular, the Competition Review Taskforce was asked to consider proposals put forward by the Commission around merger reform, as well as other competition law issues.
1.26 T he Competition Review Taskforce released a consultation paper on 20 November 2023 seeking views on:
· the effectiveness of Australia’s current merger rules and processes to enable beneficial mergers while addressing those that could be anti-competitive, and
· options for improving Australia’s merger rules and processes.
1.27 The Competition Review Taskforce consulted a diverse range of stakeholders - including the Commission, businesses, industry associations, academics, consumer groups and small business representatives. Stakeholder feedback identified shortcomings of the current approach to merger control, which are briefly outlined as follows:
· For business, some uncontentious mergers are subject to delays, uncertainty and added costs, with only limited guidance provided by the Commission.
· For the wider community, engaging with the Commission’s merger reviews is often difficult and the current approach lacks transparency in some aspects.
· For the Commission, the voluntary nature of the current approach to merger review can mean it may not receive timely, upfront notifications of proposed acquisitions. This can impede its ability to detect and prevent anti-competitive mergers and acquisitions effectively and efficiently. For example, there have been instances where businesses threatened to complete a transaction before the Commission has completed its review, failed to notify (including for international cross-border mergers and acquisitions), and/or provided insufficient or inaccurate information to the Commission.
· The cost of merger control is borne by the public due to the lack of cost recovery mechanisms in a voluntary informal system.
1.28 The Commission has also raised concerns about enforcement under the current approach if there is uncertainty or difficulty predicting the future effect of an acquisition. This is because of factors such as:
· the emphasis that the courts place on having to predict the likely state of competition in the future with and without the acquisition in order to determine whether the acquisition would have or be likely to have the effect of substantially lessening competition;
· the information asymmetry between transaction parties and the Commission; and
· the reluctance of third parties to disclose relevant but confidential business information and give evidence in court.
1.29 In addition, several types of acquisitions by businesses also do not appear to be adequately captured by the current approach to merger control:
· creeping or serial acquisitions (a series of small acquisitions by businesses which individually do not result in material changes to market concentration or competitive dynamics, but over time forms part of a strategy of consolidation);
· acquisitions by incumbents of nascent competitors (acquisitions by a leading company in its industry of a firm that may potentially pose a serious competitive threat to that leading company); and
· expansions into related markets, including by digital platforms.
1.30 On 10 April 2024, taking into account stakeholder feedback, the Government announced proposed reforms to improve Australia’s merger rules by introducing a mandatory and suspensory administrative merger control system. The new system will be faster, stronger, simpler, more transparent and more targeted.
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General
1.31 The amendments replace the current approach with a mandatory and suspensory administrative system for acquisitions.1.32 The amendments introduce a mandatory obligation on parties to acquisitions that meet certain thresholds to notify the Commission of the proposed acquisition, unless the Commission has determined that the acquisition does not require notification, before putting it into effect. Thresholds will be determined by the Minister by legislative instrument.
1.33 Thresholds will be regularly reviewed and set with respect to evidence of the risk of potential harms to the community over time. To ensure that the system is fit for purpose as businesses evolve and minimise avoidance, the Minister will be able to determine whether certain categories of transactions should be notifiable or exempt from notification. The Commission will regularly report on the number of notifications made and provide a general description of the kinds of acquisitions notified.
1.34 To increase certainty and support efficient administration of the new system, the amendments also provide for parties to seek a notification waiver from the Commission. Upon application, the Commission will be able to determine that an acquisition is not required to be notified. The requirements for a notification waiver application are to be determined by the Minister in a legislative instrument.
1.35 The amendments provide that an acquisition must not be put into effect in circumstances including in which:
· the acquisition is required to be notified but has not been notified to the Commission;
· the acquisition has been notified to the Commission, but the Commission has not made a determination in respect of it;
· the Commission has determined it must not be put into effect;
· an application for a public benefit determination may be made, or has been made but not yet determined;
· a person may seek or has sought review by the Tribunal; or
· 12 months has elapsed after the Commission made a determination in respect of the notification or public benefit application.
1.36 An acquisition, which has been put into effect, or purportedly put into effect, when it must not be, is rendered void by the amendments.
1.37 The Commission will assess notified acquisitions by applying the ‘substantial lessening of competition’ test. An acquisition may have the effect of substantially lessening competition in a market if it would or would be likely to have the effect of creating, strengthening or entrenching a substantial degree of power in the market. To consider whether an acquisition is likely to substantially lessen competition, also requires an assessment of the relevant markets in which the parties compete or operate affected by the acquisition, as well as adjacent markets, whether that is at a national or local level, wholly or partly in Australia.
1.38 The amendments establish a two-phased approach for the Commission’s assessment of an acquisition against the ‘substantial lessening of competition’ test. All notified acquisitions will be considered by the Commission in an initial stage, known as Phase 1. Where no competition concerns are raised, the Commission may quickly determine that a notified acquisition can proceed.
1.39 For acquisitions that the Commission is satisfied could be likely to substantially lessen competition, the Commission may decide that the acquisition be subject to a further in-depth stage, known as Phase 2. The Commission will give parties written notice of the decision that a notification is subject to Phase 2 review. If the Commission does not give a Phase 2 notice, the notified acquisition may proceed.
1.40 To promote timely decision-making on the merits, the opportunity to seek review under the ADJR Act for the decision to commit an acquisition to a Phase 2 review has been limited. This approach balances the need for judicial oversight with the Government's objective of providing more efficient resolutions, ensuring that critical decisions are not unduly prolonged by extensive legal challenges.
1.41 During Phase 2, the Commission must issue a notice of competition concerns to the parties setting out the Commission’s preliminary assessment of whether the acquisition would be likely to substantially lessen competition in any market and the grounds for that assessment.
1.42 At the end of Phase 2, the Commission must determine that an acquisition may be put into effect, with or without conditions, unless it is satisfied that the acquisition would have the effect or be likely to have the effect of substantially lessening competition.
1.43 To facilitate mergers that are of net public benefit to the community, upon application by the parties, the Commission may approve an acquisition that would, or would be likely to have the effect of substantially lessening competition if the Commission is satisfied it would be likely to result in a public benefit that outweighs the public detriment.
1.44 The amendments set out the timeframes in which the Commission must make its determination under Phase 1 and Phase 2, and for public benefit applications. Timeframes are also specified for reviews by the Tribunal of Commission decisions.
1.45 As a safeguard and to promote the integrity of the system, parties may apply for review by the Tribunal, an independent administrative decision-making body with economic, business and legal expertise, based on the material before the Commission and other certain information at the Tribunal’s discretion.
1.46 It is the intention of the Government that the administration of the system operates to deliver timely decision-making. The amendments provide for this through the levels of decision-making, primarily by:
· implementing a two-phased, scaled approach to the assessment of the competition impacts of acquisitions that meet the thresholds,
· a process for considering public benefit applications, and
· providing for merits review via the Tribunal, which appropriately balances timely decision-making and the interests of parties.
1.47 The Government considers that parties to an acquisition should be able to engage with the Commission on the status of their applications on a regular and reasonable basis. Further, the Commission will issue new and updated substantive competition and public benefit guidelines, as well as new process guidelines, to inform businesses, stakeholders and the community.
1.48 The current system fundamentally relies on enforcement and court decisions for setting incentives for merger parties. An administrative system shifts the emphasis to the Commission as administrative steward to provide public guidance and meaningful engagement for merger parties and strengthens powers for identifying and stopping anti-competitive mergers. This will provide more certainty for parties to an acquisition and improved community understanding of competition concerns - and most importantly, less incentive for anti-competitive acquisitions.
1.49 Consistent with the object of the CCA, it is also the intention of Government that the Commission has the capacity to prevent acquisitions that have an anticompetitive effect on Australians irrespective of the location of the parties to the acquisitions. The Commission will have the powers to assess acquisitions that impact Australia wherever those acquisitions occur or wherever the parties are located.
1.50 To create the new system, the amendments add new Division 1A into Part IV. New Division 1A in Part IV sets out contravention provisions which are replicated in the Schedule version of Part IV, to include them as part of the Competition Code. This ensures they operate in all States and Territories of Australia.
1.51 The amendments also introduce new Part IVA into the CCA which comprises six Divisions:
· Division 1 - preliminary (see Chapter 1: Overview)
· Division 2 - acquisitions that are required to be notified (see Chapter 2: Scope of acquisition notification requirements)
· Division 3 - notification of acquisitions (see Chapter 3: Notification process and suspensory rule)
· Division 4 - Commission consideration of acquisitions: substantial lessening of competition (see Chapter 4: Substantial lessening of competition)
· Division 5 - Commission consideration of acquisitions: public benefit (see Chapter 5: Public benefit)
· Division 6 - miscellaneous (see Chapters 2, 6 and 7).
1.52 Part IX of the CCA has been amended to include Divisions 1A and 1B to provide for review by the Tribunal (see Chapter 6: Review of Decisions).
1.53 It should be noted that the Commission as an administrative decision-maker is subject to general administrative law principles that regulate government decision-making, as well as judicial review.
1.54 As a decision-maker, the Commission must afford procedural fairness. This means the Commission must give the affected parties to an acquisition the opportunity to be heard before making a decision that affects them and be impartial in its decision-making. These general rules are known as the ‘hearing rule’ and the ‘bias rule’. A number of specific administrative law rules will apply to Commission decisions, for example decision also cannot be ‘so unreasonable that no reasonable person could have so exercised the power’ (section 5 of the ADJR Act). Many of the Commission’s decisions will also be subject to an obligation to provide detailed reasons under section 13 of the ADJR Act.
Acquisitions provisions
1.55 Acquisitions provision under the new law means any of the following provisions and any other provision in the CCA to the extent that it relates to such a provision:
· a provision in the new Division 1A of Part IV;
· a provision in the new Part IVA;
· a provision in the new Division 1B of Part IX.
[Schedule 1, item 6, subsection 4(1) of the CCA, definition of “acquisitions provision”]
1.56 The new Division 1A of Part IV introduces several obligations and prohibitions in relation to notified acquisitions (e.g. obligation to notify, comply with conditions imposed by the Commission, etc.).
1.57 The new Part IVA introduces a mandatory and suspensory administrative system for certain acquisitions. A simplified outline of key aspects of Part IVA of the Act is included in section 51ABA of the Act.
[Schedule 1, item 35, section 51ABA]1.58 New Divisions 1A and 1B of Part IX provide for review by the Tribunal of certain decisions made by the Commission and also sets out the process for applying for Tribunal review, the Tribunal’s functions and powers and procedural matters such as time limits, and information gathering. Minor consequential changes are made to headings to reflect the insertion of Divisions 1A and 1B.
[Schedule 1, items 49 to 51 and 56, sections 100A to 100H, 100J to 100N, 100P to 100T, 111 to 113 and Part IX (heading) and Division 1 of Part IX (heading) of the CCA]1.59 The amendments also insert other definitions relating to these provisions in the CCA or amend existing definitions to take account of the new provisions.
[Schedule 1, items 6 to 11 and 35, subsections 4(1) and 4A(5A) and section 51ABK of the CCA]Application to persons, partnerships and trusts
Persons
1.60 The acquisitions provisions apply to acquisitions by persons due to the application of the Competition Code by the States and Territories. This extends the reach of the new merger control system beyond corporations to cover a wider range of economic actors.
Partnerships and trusts
1.61 The acquisitions provisions apply to partnerships and unit trusts subject to certain modifications.
[Schedule 1, item 35, subsections 51ABZZJ(1) and 51ABZZK(1) of the CCA]1.62 The modifications ensure that the acquisitions provisions can effectively cover acquisitions involving partnerships and trusts structures, attributing obligations and liability in a manner that reflects their practical and economic realities.
Partnerships
1.63 The acquisitions provisions apply to partnerships as if they were persons, but with the following changes:
· obligations are imposed on each partner but may be discharged by any of the partners.
[Schedule 1, item 35, subsection 51ABZZJ(2) of the CCA]· offences otherwise committed by the partnership are taken to be committed by each partner who did the relevant act or made the relevant omission (or aided, abetted, counselled, procured or was knowingly concerned in or party to the relevant act or omission). The same applies in relation to contraventions of civil penalty provisions.
[Schedule 1, item 35, subsections 51ABZZJ(3) and (4) of the CCA]1.64 These provisions also provide that:
· if all the partners in a partnership are corporations, a reference to a corporation in the acquisitions provisions is taken to include the partnership; and
· a change in the composition of the partnership does not affect the continuity of the partnership.
[Schedule 1, item 35, subsections 51ABZZJ(5) and (6) of the CCA]Unit trusts
1.65 The acquisitions provisions apply to unit trusts as if they were persons, but with the following changes:
· If the unit trust has a single trustee:
obligations are imposed on the trustee;
offences are taken to have been committed by the trustee; and
a reference to a corporation in the acquisitions provisions is taken to include the trust if the trustee is a corporation.
[Schedule 1, item 35, subsection 51ABZZK(2) of the CCA]
· If the unit trust has multiple trustees:
obligations are imposed on each trustee but may be discharged by any of the trustees;
offences are taken to have been committed by the trustee who did the relevant act or made the relevant omission (or aided, abetted, counselled, procured or was knowingly concerned in or party to the relevant act or omission); and
a reference to a corporation in the acquisitions provisions includes the trust if all of the trustees are corporations.
[Schedule 1, item 35, subsection 51ABZZK(3) of the CCA]
1.66 Rules that apply to offences also apply in a corresponding manner to the contravention of civil penalty provisions.
[Schedule 1, item 35, subsection 51ABZZK(4) of the CCA]Meaning of ‘party to an acquisition’ and ‘target’
Party to acquisitions
1.67 For the purposes of the acquisitions provisions, the new law clarifies who is considered a party to an acquisition.
1.68 A party to an acquisition is:
· the person acquiring the shares, assets, or a determined thing (referred to as the principal party); and
· a person party to a contract, arrangement, or understanding pursuant to which the acquisition takes place.
[Schedule 1, item 35, subsection 51ABI(1) of the CCA]1.69 The term principal party is used to describe the key person involved in an acquisition, usually being the acquirer.
1.70 The law also clarifies that a reference to a party or principal party to an acquisition that has not been put into effect is a reference to a person that would be a party or principal party to the acquisition if the acquisition were put into effect.
[Schedule 1, item 35, subsection 51ABI(2) of the CCA]1.71 The term target is:
· for an acquisition of shares in the capital of a body corporate, the body corporate;
· for an acquisition of assets of a person, the person; and
· for an acquisition of anything determined under paragraphs 51ABB(1)(c) or (f), the person or entity determined.
[Schedule 1, item 35, subsection 51ABI(3) of the CCA]
Second reading speeches
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I move:
That this bill be now read a second time.
Today we are really proud to be introducing the Treasury Laws Amendment (Mergers and Acquisitions Reform) Bill 2024.
I'm also introducing it on behalf of my colleague the Assistant Minister for Competition, Charities and Treasury, and I'd like to take this opportunity to acknowledge him and to thank him for the really substantial work that he does for the government and for the country when it comes to competition reform, supported, as always, by the Assistant Treasurer, the Prime Minister and our colleagues in the ministry.
This bill is another big step towards reforming Australia's merger rules and further boosting competition and productivity in our economy.
It outlines the biggest reforms to Australia's merger settings in almost 50 years.
It will create a regime that more efficiently and effectively targets mergers that are anticompetitive, while allowing mergers that are procompetitive to proceed faster.
We understand that most mergers have genuine economic benefits and are an important feature of any healthy, open economy.
They can attract capital and retool businesses and improve the uptake of new technologies.
They can allow businesses to achieve greater economies of scale and scope, to access new resources, technology and expertise.
This can flow through to consumers via greater product choice and quality as well as lower prices.
But some mergers can cause serious economic harm.
This can happen when businesses aren't interested in improving profitability by lifting productivity.
When they're solely focused on squeezing out competitors to capture a larger percentage of the market.
This can strangle innovation. It can reduce productivity in our economy and punish consumers with reduced choice.
Treasury's competition taskforce has spent a lot of its time hearing about and thinking about these issues.
The assistant minister and I set up this taskforce and its work has made plain that Australia's approach to mergers is no longer fit for purpose.
The need for reform is very clear.
Australia is one of only three OECD countries that doesn't require compulsory notification of mergers.
Last year, over 1,400 mergers were recorded, at a value of around $300 billion.
Meanwhile, the ACCC looked at an average of 330 mergers a year over the past decade.
But we don't know whether these are the right 330, or the mergers with the greatest potential to cause harm.
When the ACCC does assess mergers, the current approach is not transparent enough for businesses or for the community.
Clearance can be too slow and cause expensive delays for some businesses as they wait.
This legislation will bring our merger system into the 21st century.
This bill enshrines our historic reforms into law.
The legislation will improve our regime in five ways, by making the system faster, stronger, simpler, more targeted and more transparent.
Approvals will be faster under the new system, with mergers ticked within 30 working days where the ACCC is satisfied they pose no threat to competition.
The regime will be stronger thanks to a mandatory notification system and empowering the ACCC as the decision-maker on all mergers.
The system will be simpler, because we are reducing three streams to one streamlined path to approval that removes duplication and standardises notification requirements for mergers.
It will be more targeted, because mergers that create, strengthen or entrench substantial market power will be identified and stopped while those consistent with our national economic interest will be fast-tracked.
Finally, the merger regime will be more transparent, by ensuring the ACCC has better visibility of merger activity.
We are creating a public register of all mergers and acquisitions notified to the ACCC to promote this transparency and this accountability.
Reviews of ACCC decisions will be the responsibility of the Competition Tribunal made up of a Federal Court judge, an economist and a business leader.
Under the strengthened system, not every merger will be captured.
Only mergers above monetary thresholds will need to be notified to the ACCC and be approved before proceeding.
The government intends to set these monetary thresholds in regulations following the passage of this bill.
There will be three key thresholds.
Firstly, any merger will be looked at if the Australian turnover of the combined businesses is above $200 million, and either the business or assets being acquired has Australian turnover above $50 million or global transaction value above $250 million.
Secondly, the ACCC will look at any merger involving a very large business with Australian turnover more than $500 million buying a smaller business or assets with Australian turnover above $10 million.
Finally, to target serial acquisitions, all mergers by businesses with combined Australian turnover of more than $200 million where the cumulative Australian turnover from acquisitions in the same or similar goods or services over a three-year period is at least $50 million will be captured, or $10 million if a very large business is involved.
Land acquisitions involving residential property development and certain commercial property acquisitions won't be included to avoid clogging up the system with simple land purchases unless they are captured by additional targeted notification requirements.
These thresholds have been developed in close consultation with industry and with the community.
The thresholds strike the right balance between creating a rigorous and robust regime without having to call in every single merger.
These thresholds will allow the ACCC to focus its efforts on the mergers that really matter.
We want to see the majority of mergers approved quickly, so the ACCC can focus on the minority that do give rise to competition concerns.
The thresholds will be reviewed 12 months after coming into effect, to ensure they are working as they are intended to.
In addition, the legislation provides flexibility to allow the Treasurer to adjust and calibrate the thresholds to respond to evidence based concerns from the ACCC about high-risk mergers, like in the supermarket sector.
This power, combined with the thresholds, will allow the ACCC to review all the mergers that they have been typically concerned about.
Using this provision, the government intends to make sure the ACCC is notified of every merger in the supermarket sector.
Our intention to mandate this approach is based on evidence already provided by the competition regulator.
Reviewing every supermarket merger is all part of the decisive action our government is taking to help Australians get fairer prices at the checkout.
We want to make sure supermarket mergers don't come at the cost of Australians, families and pensioners getting a fair price on their grocery bills.
Our merger reforms will help ensure our supermarkets are as competitive as they can be so that Australians get the best prices possible.
On the advice of the ACCC chair, the government also intends to use this power to get the competition regulator to review purchases of an interest above 20 per cent in an unlisted or private company, if one of the companies involved in the deal has turnover more than $200 million.
This is all about lifting the level of scrutiny and transparency for private markets transactions, which have boomed in Australia in the last decade.
It will give the ACCC the ability to analyse changes of control in private companies to ensure negative competition effects are avoided and to scrutinise these deals in more detail.
The government will also consider designation requirements for sectors such as fuel, liquor and oncology-radiology.
These merger laws will take effect from 1 January 2026 and apply voluntarily for six months before that from 1 July 2025.
This bill has been developed through really detailed consultation, and I wanted to take a moment here to thank everyone for their contributions.
We are especially grateful for the input from the Expert Advisory Panel, comprising Kerry Schott, David Gonski, John Asker, Sharon Henrick, John Fingleton, Danielle Wood and Rod Sims.
We're also thankful for all the discussions and consultation we have held with businesses—individually and peak groups—the competition regulator and the broader community.
That input and those views helped to shape this legislation that we are presenting to the House this morning.
This bill also builds on the Albanese Labor government's substantial and broad competition reform agenda, which is all about creating a more dynamic, more productive and more resilient economy.
This includes revitalising National Competition Policy with all state and territory governments.
It includes abolishing around 500 nuisance tariffs to cut compliance costs, reduce red tape, make it easier to do business, and boost productivity; helping Australians get a fair price at the check-out with a new, mandatory Food and Grocery Code, an ACCC inquiry and more funding for its investigations, reforms for planning and zoning regulations and funding for CHOICE, so that there's more price transparency; promoting competition in our financial system, including in payments, financial market infrastructure and through the introduction of a financial services regulatory grid; and helping bank customers find and follow better deals on their mortgages and higher interest rates on their savings accounts.
This agenda will help expand choices, lift living standards and grow our economy.
It will help ensure that our people, businesses and industries are beneficiaries of the opportunities before us in the defining decade ahead.
The legislation I introduce today forms a key part of these competition reforms.
We are proud to introduce it to the House.
I thank my colleague, again, and I point honourable members to full details of the measure, which are contained in the explanatory memorandum.
Debate adjourned.
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Today I address the Treasury Laws Amendment (Mergers and Acquisitions Reform) Bill 2024 and move the second reading amendment circulated in my name:
That all words after "That" be omitted with a view to substituting the following words:
"whilst not declining to give the bill a second reading, the House notes:
(1) the government has failed to recognise competition risks and sector-specific challenges within the supermarket, hardware, and aviation sectors, and failed to make meaningful progress on the Consumer Data Right, and News Media Bargaining Code;
(2) the Coalition support strong competition policy and the principle of an aligning our merger laws with international best practice; and
(3) the Coalition has concerns about this legislation, namely:
(a) the feasibility of scaled pre-approval and the risk for cost blowouts for the ACCC;
(b) the impact on business activity, innovation—particularly for SMEs and start ups;
(c) the compliance burden being imposed across the economy, compared to targeted and structural ex-post remedies; and
(d) the need to balance regulatory action with market confidence".
The coalition will not oppose this bill, but we do have grave concerns about the risks of its implementation if poorly handled. Australians and Australian businesses have good reason to doubt this government's ability to implement complex policy. Under Labor the price of almost everything has gone up. The Prime Minister famously promised that life would be cheaper under Labor, but nothing could be further from the truth. After two years of Labor, inflation is still too high. It has been persistent and stubborn. Indeed we are at the back of the pack in bringing it to heel. Interest rates have increased 12 times, and, unlike other countries, we're not seeing reductions. Families' real disposable incomes have collapsed. We have been in a per capita recession for 18 months. For the majority of the time Labor has been in power, they have seen a household recession, with the economy going backwards on a per person basis.
As I said a moment ago, we're at the back of the pack in terms of interest rates coming down. We've seen them come down in the United States, Canada, the UK and New Zealand, but here there is no relief in sight. In a very short while, the Reserve Bank will be making another decision, and it will be important to look at what they have to say. At the same time as mortgage payments have increased, families are paying more for their energy bills, paying more at the check-out and paying more for insurance. They're paying more for just about everything. For many families, going to the supermarket for the weekly shop has been a source of enormous stress. Food banks and charities across the nation have seen demand for their services skyrocket. I make a point of visiting food banks and charities when I go to many electorates, and I have seen this time and time again.
When families are struggling with the cost of essential items, it's more important than ever that customers can have faith in the businesses that serve them, including of course the supermarkets. In recent weeks we've seen concerning findings from the ACCC in relation to supermarket conduct. It's clear that the announcement of legal action against Coles and Woolworths by the ACCC should be of concern to all Australian consumers. The allegations in this case relate to practices around discounting. If they are true and if indeed there has been misleading and deceptive conduct in discounting practices by the supermarkets, it's a damning indictment of a market sector that Australian families and farmers rely on for their livelihoods. They need that sector to act in good faith. It's not what we expect, and it's not what families expect, yet this government, we believe, has been way too slow to act on competition policy. That's not just true in our supermarket sector. It's across the economy, whether it's the News Media Bargaining Code; the Consumer Data Right and the support for open banking, which can open up financial services to far more competition; or the serious cartel allegations against the CFMEU. Indeed, this is an area where competition can act as a disinfectant, but there's no interest from those opposite.
We've been leading the way on the issues since the start of this term and, indeed, since before that. We've seen examples of this in the package of bills introduced by me and the member for Maranoa yesterday and in the acceleration of the passage of the Consumer Data Right legislation, after Labor let it sit in the Senate for two years. Our approach is about getting the balance right, strengthening the food and grocery code and introducing a targeted divestiture penalty to put businesses in this sector on notice that we expect them to act in the interests of their customers. The best regulator of any industry is a customer—a well-informed customer with genuine competition to provide goods and services to them—and that's what we want to see more of.
As shadow Treasurer, I approached this bill with a recognition of the need for, as I said, effective competition policy but also with a commitment to practical reform that enhances the strength of our economy without imposing unnecessary burdens. Australia's current voluntary merger clearance system has provided flexibility, encouraging businesses to innovate and grow while the ACCC addresses anticompetitive conduct through established channels. The bill's shift to a mandatory pre-authorisation framework for mergers and acquisitions aligns with the UK and the US, and it marks a significant departure from our tradition, with its voluntary pre-authorisation framework.
Whilst we believe this is well intentioned, we do have real concerns about some of the details of the approach and particularly the risks in implementation, not least because we do believe it imposes a whole-of-economy compliance burden on businesses both large and small. The model may address competition issues in concentrated sectors—and we certainly hope it does—but it does risk, if not carefully implemented, becoming an undue burden on sectors where competition is healthy and thriving. The government must consider whether this blanket approach serves the intended purpose or simply entangles our economy in red tape and implementation. This is why I say the implementation and the way it's done by the ACCC and the government will be absolutely crucial.
I'll go into a little bit more detail on the bill. It introduces mandatory notification requirements for mergers and acquisitions, with compliance costs estimated by Treasury to reach between $50,000 and $100,000 per transaction, potentially generating up to $50 million in new annual compliance costs. Whilst it is true that good regulation can make a difference, we don't want a system that simply feeds more lawyers, consultants and the rest, without delivering a better outcome for consumers at the same time. These sorts of costs may seem manageable for large corporations, but, for smaller businesses, startups and innovators, they risk being prohibitive and dampening the entrepreneurial drive that powers our economy.
We worry that the compliance burden will weigh heaviest on the businesses least equipped to bear it, and that's particularly small to medium-sized enterprises. As I said, they already face a lot of red tape right now in doing business. These companies need the flexibility to thrive, not a policy framework that treats them as if they're the same as market-dominant giants. Imposing these additional costs and regulatory steps on all businesses rather than targeting specific sectors where there are competition concerns risks damaging the very sectors that drive growth and innovation, and the discretion around that will be left to the ACCC, so it's absolutely essential that the ACCC gets that implementation right.
The ACCC's expanded role under this bill will require considerable resources, with phase 2 reviews alone estimated to cost upwards of $500,000 per transaction. Keep in mind that phase 1 is a 30-day process which is designed to clear the vast majority of transactions. Phase 2 is the much more detailed reviews, going up to 90 days. They are estimated to cost upwards of $500,000.
With this bill the regulator's capacity will be tested further. There's no doubt about that. Implementation, as I say, will be crucial. With the ACCC already experiencing a significant increase in both budget and headcount there are serious questions about whether the case has been properly worked through for further resourcing. Indeed, in the last five years, we have seen the ACCC grow, with an extra 400 staff and over $200 million in increased funding. While, if that's delivering better competition outcomes, we absolutely support it, we can't create a behemoth where every dollar of public spending is crucial in a time like today. Stakeholders suggest that transaction volumes may well exceed the government's projections, potentially resulting in costs well above $100 billion annually. These additional regulatory expenses must be justified. The coalition questions whether this cost-intensive approach is the most effective use of taxpayers' money. While there is great value in a good regulatory and well-targeted regulatory framework, a balance must be struck that avoids placing excessive burdens on the private sector while ensuring the ACCC's focus is effective and resource efficient.
The impact of the bill on SMEs and start-ups, as I mentioned earlier, warrants close scrutiny. The compliance costs involved could stifle growth in the very sectors where we need more of it. Start-ups by their very nature rely on timely marketing, flexibility and often rapid strategic changes in a company's direction. Imposing universal pre-authorisation requirements risks inhibiting these businesses which are critical to the future of our competitiveness as an economy and country. The coalition has long championed competition policy that enables innovation and supports small businesses, which are typically much more agile, adaptable and resilient than larger businesses can ever be. In the end, it will be consumers that lose out if the target is wrong.
Our competition challenges aren't evenly distributed across the economy. They're particularly concentrated in some sectors. I have talked already about supermarkets, where the two major players have about two-thirds of the market. In hardware, aviation, energy and the digital economy, in each of those sectors, there is very serious market concentration. The ACCC has rightly highlighted that these are the sectors where competition could be strengthened, and we certainly don't want to see it weakened. We believe that, if the ACCC gets the focus right, those sectors are the ones where they should be showing more scepticism towards transactions that might enhance or increase market power or substantially reduce competition. By focusing on those sectors, I think we stand our best chance of getting the balance right.
The coalition stands committed to competition reform that enhances growth, delivers real benefits for Australian consumers and businesses and, most important of all, puts the customer in charge. That's what we believe in. The customer is the best regulator in the industry. There is a simple reason for that. Ultimately, the customer knows what they want. They know in a way no central planner or bureaucrat can ever know what they want. But they can only do that if they have competition and if they have choice. If they have those things, they become the regulator that we need most. In doing so, in making choices, they help every other consumer. The wonderful thing about competition and choice is that consumers help each other. When they decide that a product is too expensive, they are sending a signal which others benefit from, and businesses have to respond. It's a wonderful thing that we can see—competition providing that sort of benefit to all Australians.
That's why a robust competition framework is essential, but it can't become sludge and red tape. As I say, this will be a challenge for the ACCC. We praise the fact that there will be a review after one year to see it if it is delivering and is being implemented correctly, and it's incredibly important that that review be done well and get the balance right in assessing whether the costs of this framework are in line with the benefits or, hopefully, whether the benefits will be substantially more. We'll continue to examine this closely through the Senate inquiry and Senate estimates processes, and there's an opportunity there to look at whether this can be made to work better and whether the costs are going to be outweighed by the benefits. But we always stand ready to work towards balanced, targeted solutions that will strengthen competition where it is most needed, supporting growth, innovation and, most of all, the prosperity and choices of all Australians.
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The Treasury Laws Amendment (Mergers and Acquisitions Reform) Bill 2024 is a landmark piece of legislation that will modernise Australia's merger framework for the first time in nearly five decades. This reform is about striking a critical balance: equipping our competition regulator with the authority it needs to safeguard markets and protect consumers while also enabling it to operate with speed and clarity, providing certainty for businesses and for our economy at large.
Mergers and acquisitions are absolutely essential to a thriving economy. They bring investment and allow businesses to scale and promote innovation. Successful mergers can drive greater efficiencies, expand consumer choices and, importantly, lower costs. However, not all mergers are beneficial for consumers or for our economy. Some entrench market power, reduce competition and, ultimately, harm consumers. For instance, in the supermarket sector, acquisitions by dominant chains have reduced competition in local markets, leaving consumers with fewer options and higher prices, particularly in regional areas. Similarly, in telecommunications, mergers between major providers have raised concerns about reduced market competition leading to higher costs and slower innovation in essential services such as mobile and internet access. These examples highlight how unchecked consolidation can harm Australians in their everyday lives and underscore the need for reform.
Such harmful mergers show why a robust and responsive competition regime is absolutely essential. We must ensure that harmful mergers are identified and prevented, fostering a competitive environment that delivers fair prices, greater choice and innovation for Australians, yet Australia's current system falls short of what a modern economy needs. We are one of only three OECD nations without a mandatory notification system for mergers, leaving our competition regulator, the ACCC, to rely on a voluntary and highly reactive process. This creates significant blind spots, allowing mergers with potential risks to competition to proceed without adequate scrutiny. Meanwhile, pro-competitive and non-contentious mergers often face delays and uncertainty, burdening businesses unnecessarily.
The Albanese government's reforms will bring Australia's merger framework into the 21st century. These changes will establish a mandatory notification system, providing the ACCC with full visibility of significant transactions. This ensures that the regulator can focus on the mergers that pose the greatest risks to competition, while businesses pursuing beneficial transactions are supported with a streamlined and efficient process. The reforms will strengthen the ACCC's ability to act decisively. Pro-competitive mergers will advance quickly, with a clear pathway for approvals within 30 working days where there are no concerns for consumers. Harmful or risky transactions, on the other hand, will be scrutinised and, if necessary, prevented. This balance of ensuring markets are both dynamic and protected is critical to the health of our economy.
The bill also introduces monetary thresholds to focus resources where they are most needed. By targeting mergers with the potential to lessen competition substantially, the ACCC can direct its efforts toward transactions with significant economic impact. Transparency and accountability will also be enhanced for the creation of a public register of notified mergers, giving businesses, consumers and stakeholders a clearer view of the process.
These reforms are integral to our broader economic vision—an economy built on strong competition, higher productivity and good wages for working people. Competition is the lifeblood of a dynamic economy. It compels businesses to innovate, improve efficiency and deliver better value to consumers, but its benefits extend far beyond markets. When businesses innovate and productivity rises, workers are better positioned to share in these gains of secure jobs, higher wages and improved conditions. By fostering competition, we reduce the power of monopolies and oligopolies that distort markets and concentrate wealth in fewer hands. Fairer markets lead to fairer outcomes, lower prices for essential goods and services, greater access to opportunities for workers and more choices for consumers. Importantly, fair competition encourages businesses to invest in their people, recognising that skilled and well-supported workers are critical to long-term success.
The Albanese government's approach reflects our belief that strong competition, higher productivity and good wages for working people are not just desirable but essential for a fairer, stronger and more resilient economy. Through these reforms, we ensure that Australia's economic growth lifts everyone, building a future that rewards effort, encourages innovation and supports working Australians and their families. These outcomes are only possible with a regulator equipped to act decisively and efficiently. That is why these reforms provide the ACCC with the authority and the framework to protect competition effectively. Pro-competitive mergers will move forward without unnecessary delays, while harmful or risky transactions will face rigorous scrutiny and intervention if required. This approach not only fosters market dynamism but also safeguards consumer interests.
These are key foundations for our strong and fair economy. This reform reflects our commitment to ensuring a competition regulator that is both effective and efficient in protecting the interests of Australians, while providing businesses with greater certainty. It demonstrates the Albanese Labor government's dedication to creating a stronger, fairer and more competitive economy that benefits all Australians now and into the future.
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There's no doubt Australia is in a period of significant economic transition. The COVID-19 pandemic disrupted many critical industries, both globally and domestically, and it will be some time before our economy fully recovers. Coming out the other side of the pandemic, we've entered an inflationary environment that puts immense pressure on consumers, businesses and governments. At the same time, we are embarking on a much-needed transition to a net zero economy. In this context, competition is more important than ever before. This transition will impact Australia's critical industries, consumers and small businesses in profound ways. New markets are on the horizon, and it is impossible to anticipate how they will emerge or develop.
Competition can be a driving force for investment, dynamism and innovation. All are required to undertake this transition; therefore, it is critical we protect it by getting our competition policy reform right from the start. While most merger transactions do not harm competition and, indeed, provide many benefits, some can and do affect the competitive conditions of an industry. The growing trend of market concentration in Australia since the early 2000s is not one that we should continue to ignore.
According to a 2023 report from e61 Institute, in seven per cent of Australian industries the top four firms had more than 80 per cent of the market share. I just want to repeat that. In seven per cent of Australian industries, the top four firms had more than 80 per cent market share. Compare this to countries like the United States, where only one per cent of the industries have a market concentration that high. Ultimately, however, my community and indeed most Australians don't need statistics to understand the problem. Whether it's electricity, health insurance or retail, the Australian economy is rife with examples of markets where a few big players dominate, and, as a consequence, consumers are arguably missing out while producers and suppliers are squeezed ruthlessly.
We see this perhaps most acutely in the tech and supermarket sectors. In tech, a handful of companies are playing an increasingly significant role in our lives, influencing how we interact with each other and do business. I had a striking real-world experience when I recently tried to plug my iPhone into the jack of a Volvo that my friend owns. I received a message from my phone saying, 'This accessory is not supported by the device.' The Volvo was the accessory that the iPhone wouldn't accommodate! I was struck by Apple's market concentration and their ability to corner the market. Meanwhile, in the supermarket sector, Woolworths and Coles alone control about two-thirds of the market. Again, I've witnessed the implications of this personally, with many orchards in my home town of Coonabarabran forced to bulldoze their trees after the long-term local independent grocer was acquired by one of the two large supermarket chains.
Part of the problem is the ability of large businesses to hollow out markets through targeted acquisitions. As multiple former ACCC chairs have acknowledged, Australia's current merger regime is not well placed to deal with this problem. Under the ACCC's current framework, companies aren't required to notify the ACCC of mergers, leaving the commission most often flying blind. Additionally, the ACCC reviews only a fraction of the mergers that happen each year—an average of 330 annually of the more than 1,000 mergers that occur. This gap leads to situations like that of Petstock, which grew through a series of small acquisitions into the second-largest speciality pet supply retail chain in Australia, unbeknownst to the ACCC. No wonder the former ACCC chair Rod Sims has described Australia's merger regime as the weakest of any country we compare ourselves to.
These trends have consequences for us all. Recent decades have seen businesses increase the mark-ups to goods and services by more than two per cent. As CHOICE and the Consumers Federation of Australia put it, consumers pay the price of highly concentrated markets, including through higher prices, poorer customer service and lower product and service quality. In this context, I largely welcome this bill and commend the government for taking steps towards a regime that more effectively targets anticompetitive mergers while fast-tracking mergers that are pro-competition. It is a step towards a future focused economy that is diverse, efficient and welcoming of new market entrants.
However, there are ways I believe this legislation, and competition policy reform more broadly, could be improved. Firstly, we must ensure that the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission are adequately staffed and resourced to effectively manage the significant increase in assessments that will result from the changes outlined in this bill. Secondly, we must strengthen the ACCC's ability to block problematic mergers. Thirdly, we must ensure thresholds for notification capture all anticompetitive acquisitions. Finally, to truly improve competition and innovation in Australia, we must not only prevent anticompetitive mergers but also actively support small and emerging businesses.
I'll go to the specifics of the bill before us. This bill will empower the ACCC as the decision-maker on all mergers. Under this new system, the commission would undertake an economic and legal assessment to determine whether acquisitions are likely to substantially reduce competition or be of public benefit. This would be tied to a mandatory notification system where acquisitions that meet a certain threshold would need to be referred to the ACCC for assessment prior to completion. These key thresholds are (1) when the Australian turnover of the combined business exceeds $200 million and the assets being acquired have either an Australian turnover of more than $50 million or a global transaction value above $250 million; (2) when a business with an Australian turnover of more than $500 million is buying a smaller business with a turnover above $10 million; and, finally, (3) all mergers by businesses with a combined Australian turnover of more than $200 million where total similar acquisitions over a three-year period have a cumulative turnover of at least $50 million. Importantly, the bill allows the Treasurer to adjust these thresholds in response to concerns from the ACCC about high-risk mergers.
The commissions approval system would also be reformed with the goal of completing approvals in under 30 days for mergers that are determined not to pose a threat to competition, and these changes would also provide for the Competition Tribunal to review the ACCC's decisions. Finally, the bill would establish a public register of all mergers and acquisitions, providing all of us a clear line of sight on how our markets and suppliers are developing. As a result of these reforms, there's a lot to like about this legislation. It improves oversight for both large acquisitions and the accumulation of smaller creeping acquisitions, it makes an effort to balance this new oversight with efficiency under a faster approval process for unproblematic mergers, and it allows for the thresholds to be flexible over time.
I've noted that the ACCC currently only assesses a small proportion of mergers, however, and this reform will be a significant change for the commission as it deals with the potential for more assessments and a commitment to faster approvals. The government has argued that the increased resourcing given to the ACCC will be commensurate with the increased workload, and the January 2026 commencement date will give the commission time to prepare for the transition. This may be true, but it isn't guaranteed. We're talking about the biggest merger reform in nearly half a century. The transition will have to be managed properly to prevent a blowout in costs and delays for government and business alike.
Historically, the ACCC has been unable to prevent many large mergers. In fact, just last year, the commission blocked the ANZ bank from a $4.9 billion takeover of Suncorp's banking arm, only to have their decision overturned by the Competition Tribunal. The same thing occurred in 2017 with the merger of Tabcorp and the Tatts Group. This is not to say that the oversight of the Competition Tribunal is a bad thing, but it does suggest that the two organisations are not always aligned on principle, and it's unclear what that means for the ACCC's ability to effectively block what it may deem to be an anticompetitive acquisition.
More importantly, the thresholds in this bill may not capture several kinds of concerning mergers and acquisitions. Under this framework, for example, businesses with a combined Australian turnover of less than $200 million will not need to report unless the business or assets being acquired have a cumulative Australian turnover of over $50 million over a three-year period or a global transaction value of about $250 million.
That is already quite a high bar, but the real problem here is that these thresholds don't consider the size of the market a business is operating in. For large high-turnover markets like medical insurance or electricity retail, these thresholds may be reasonable, but, if the market is smaller, numbers like $200 million may represent a much higher percentage of total market activity, and businesses with significant market share may fly under the radar. We know that the government was considering a market concentration threshold during consultation, so I've got to confess that I'm disappointed to see that it's absent from this bill. Overall market share is a much better indicator of the problem we're trying to prevent than simple monetary turnover.
Similarly, the thresholds don't consider regional market concentration. Again, I speak from personal experience. Having grown up in regional Australia, I'm aware of the limited choices that consumers sometimes face. There might only be one bank, one grocery store and one petrol station in the whole town. Under this legislation, mergers could potentially be used to corner a market in an entire regional area while staying under the notification threshold.
The threshold also wouldn't stop large companies from gaining an early advantage in markets by acquiring early-stage companies who don't yet have a high turnover. The obvious example is Instagram. When Facebook bought Instagram, the company had no revenue. If this purchase happened in the Australian context, this bill wouldn't have required that to be referred to the ACCC. Clearly parts of this legislation could be strengthened. Instead of it simply allowing the Treasurer to adjust these thresholds over time, we should aim to get them right from the beginning. We need merger reform that tackles market share, early acquisitions and geographic considerations.
Finally, I'd like to speak about the role of small business in the context of these reforms. To truly embrace competition, we must do more than simply regulate big mergers. We need to actively support new and established small businesses. According to the Bureau of Statistics, 2023-24 saw a 1.4 per cent decrease in the number of Australian businesses with one to four employees, while businesses with five to 19 employees remained relatively stagnant with only a 0.4 per cent increase. This is reflected in the GDP figures. In 2006, small businesses contributed 40 per cent of our GDP; now that number is 33 per cent.
Australian Small Business and Family Enterprise Ombudsman Bruce Billson described Australia as 'sleepwalking into a big corporate economy'. To increase competition and drive an efficient, diverse economy, we must consider measures to support these small businesses, especially in their early stages. There are many ways we could do this, from expanding the digital learning and practical support tools available online to increasing tax offsets for new small businesses. Of particular relevance to competition reform, however, is the need to implement a ban on unfair business and trading practices which harm small businesses and discourage investment. When there is a power imbalance, big businesses in Australia can impose harsh commercial arrangements or behaviours on smaller ones. Singapore, the United Kingdom and the European Union all have laws that explicitly ban this kind of unfair practice, and Australia should follow suit. In short, we should be using all the tools at our disposal to build a competitive economy with a thriving small business sector.
I commend the government for bringing this bill before the House to improve Australia's management of large mergers and acquisitions, but I also encourage the government to make sure not only that the ACCC is resourced to handle this transition properly but also that the thresholds truly prevent mergers from slipping through the cracks and that, ultimately, we support new small businesses to create a truly future focused economy for all Australians.
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Ensuring suitable levels of competition in the Australian economy has been something many Australians have taken for granted for a long time, but currently, in a cost-of-living crisis, the issue of competition is front of mind for many of my community. Research conducted by e61 last year showed that Australia was far more prone to higher levels of market concentration compared to our peers, like the United States. And it shows. Currently we have two supermarkets that dominate 70 per cent of the food and grocery market, two airlines that represent 98 per cent of the domestic airline market, four banks representing 75 per cent of the market, four media outlets representing 78 per cent of the market, three telcos operating with 89 per cent of the communications market, three insurers representing 74 per cent of the general insurance market and, as of today, we have two political parties hoping to capture 100 per cent of the vote market.
In fact, the e61 research shows that around seven per cent of all Australian industries had more than 80 per cent of the market share, dominated by four companies or fewer. Compare this to the US, where only one per cent of their industries had that level of concentration. I admit that Australia and the US are different countries and have different market dynamics in different scale. I also acknowledge that, in certain circumstances, economies of scale mean that we do get cheaper products to consumers so there are benefits of bigger companies in certain circumstances, but I think there has never been a more urgent opportunity and urgent need for competition to be a focal point for regulation.
I welcome the Treasury Laws Amendment (Mergers and Acquisitions Reform) Bill 2024 for its intent to modernise merger reforms and introduce an international best-practice approach for dealing with competition considerations in Australia, but I and others do have concerns about the unintended consequences this bill will have for small and, particularly, young firms. While I'm glad to see there are review provisions in this legislation, we will monitor this legislation closely going forward.
The bill would replace existing merger frameworks with one including mandatory notification. In practice, this puts the onus on companies to disclose ahead of time so that proper consideration can take place, instead of requiring the ACCC to initiate proceedings. The law will specify the M&A proposals that meet one of the notification thresholds that would require mandatory reporting. These notification thresholds cover mergers that represent a combined turnover of the business that is above $200 million; part of a series of mergers of the same or similar goods and services within a three-year period; and any merger involving a very large business with a turnover of more than $500 million buying a business where the acquisition exceeds $10 million. These thresholds will increase the number of mergers the ACCC will need to review and will effectively cover many of the mergers or acquisitions of Australia's largest companies. The Senate reports notes that stakeholders are broadly on board with the proposed changes and that there is broad cross-party support.
While the monitoring of competition impacts of M&A is important, I note that this bill is not without the risk of unintended consequences. These risks particularly affect young firms if the ability to be acquired or merge is impeded or restricted. For young firms an acquisition provides one of the few opportunities for early-stage investors to exit and realise gains on an investment often made several years before. If a merger cannot take place, the investor must wait either for another investor to buy them out or for the company to list publicly. Patient capital is hard to find and getting harder, with banks and superannuation funds effectively holding their nominal investments in small-business and venture flat over the past decade. That's not a good for anyone. Acquisitions also provide good businesses and good ideas the opportunity to scale quickly. It's not always the case that a reduction in acquisition is bad. I note that the Treasurer has agreed to review the thresholds after a period of 12 months, a condition that I warmly welcome.
I also note that the impost of this regulation is of concern for different parts of the economy that I've spoken to, including the property sector and other sectors, which are questioning how they will or should be fitting into this legislation.
As I said I welcome this bill. I think it is appropriate. But I do think we need to get it right. And I do have concerns in particular about the ability of the regulator to meet the additional requirements.
As I was saying, whilst I welcome a best-practice approach, I do have concerns about the ability of the regulator to meet the additional requirements and their ability to undertake their investigations in a diligent and timely way.
The legislation requires phase 1 determinations to be made within 30 days and phase 2 determinations to be made after 90 days. But, as we've seen with other regulatory organisations, these types of benchmarks are easily skirted and often not met, and I hold the same concerns here, including that stop the clock rights exist for the ACCC as we see for other regulators. Additional requests for information are anecdotally used by regulators to create more time when they've got challenges meeting their deadlines. If this is the case, the legislation has the potential to delay mergers, costing money and resources and placing businesses through additional regulatory hurdles with limited benefit to competition and the community. I encourage the review in 12 months to also consider the responsiveness of the ACCC, to assess that as part of the review and also to assess whether measures like stop the clock or other types of additional information measures are being used in ways that are actually delaying the assessment of these applications.
I'd also like to acknowledge that this bill has undergone a Senate review that made four recommendations in light of these concerns and concerns made by others. In particular, I welcome recommendation 2. In addition to the 12 month review, the Senate report recommended an expert implementation advisory panel to be established which specifically called out the likes of the Tech Council of Australia, that represent many of these young and innovative firms. I think it is absolutely critical that young and innovative firms are represented in this sort of panel of review because it is critical that this legislation really enables competition, innovation and dynamism, and there is a danger that there could be some unintended consequences which, under certain circumstances, may actually dampen that competition, dynamism and creation of new firms. I warmly support that recommendation, and I think it would help the business community be reassured that the unintended consequences of the bill will be taken seriously.
In conclusion, I support this bill because competition is a major concern, and I note that similar models are working effectively in other jurisdictions and have the ability to ensure that Australia continues to be a country with effective and robust business competition. I support this bill because I really want to support young, innovative and small businesses, and I think it's really important that we continue to let those businesses thrive. Part of that is making sure that they have and are able to compete with larger businesses.
However, I identify the risks associated with imposing these different burdens on businesses, including stifling exit opportunities and thus investment, and delaying the process of effective mergers through regulatory bottlenecks. I think an implementation review is a sensible recommendation in addition to the 12-month review of thresholds, and I encourage the government to seriously consider implementing the recommendations of the Senate report.
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There's no doubt that a huge number of Australians are suffering serious cost-of-living challenges, and there's significant political pressure to come up with instant solutions to make a real difference to the cost of living. While the government can have an impact on inflation, many of the factors affecting inflation and the cost of living are beyond the reach of the federal government. Geopolitics, pandemics, supply chain complexities—governments may be blamed for these things, but they can't really do much about them. But one of the things that the government can impact is competition. This is not a quick fix for the cost of living, but, over the long term, getting the rules right when it comes to how companies can compete in Australia has a significant impact on costs for consumers. Effective competition drives efficiency and productivity. That means better products at lower prices for Australian consumers.
Duopolies and oligopolies are bad for consumers. While competition law is complicated, most people understand this intuitively and are suspicious of big companies having too much power. For groceries and living essentials, the Coles-Woolworths duopoly has been accused of driving up prices and passing the buck to shoppers. For travel, the Qantas-Virgin duopoly has similarly been accused of forcing out competition and passing on poor service and high costs to travellers. And, here in politics, the duopoly of the Labor and Liberal political parties has been accused of using parliamentary power to shut out new political entrants. Now, obviously the political party duopoly is not considered as part of the Treasury Laws Amendment (Mergers and Acquisitions Reform) Bill 2024, unfortunately, but it is good to see the government promoting competition in business. Voters might be stuck with less political competition, but this amendment is a good move for consumers.
The existing merger law and clearance process has been in need of reform for some time. In 2021, the then ACCC chair Rod Sims argued for reform, and his successor, Gina Cass-Gottlieb, an eminent competition lawyer with extensive experience on both sides of the merger regulation process, also supports the creation of a formal merger clearance process. The current law in the Competition and Consumer Act says that companies can't acquire shares or assets in a company that would substantially lessen competition in any market. The key problem with this law is that there's no requirement for parties to notify the ACCC before completing a merger. Because there's no requirement, the ACCC instead has established an informal merger review process, where parties can first ask the ACCC for advice on the competitiveness of the merger before it's completed. This process, which has no formal status in law, lacks transparency and does not provide an informed basis for market participants to understand their legal and regulatory risk. In short, it's not fit for purpose.
This bill amends the Competition and Consumer Act to better reflect the requirements of modern markets. This bill introduces mandatory notification when companies involved in mergers meet certain thresholds. Monetary thresholds are the simplest way for companies to know when they need to notify. This regime needs to work for businesses. But the bill also preserves an ability for the minister to introduce market-concentration-based thresholds for compulsory notification in the future. I'm concerned about this. Although these types of thresholds have been used overseas, market-concentration-based thresholds for compulsory notification add complexity and are opposed by many experts in the field of competition law because they add uncertainty, risk and compliance cost to the first step in the clearance process.
For this reason I'll be proposing an amendment to delete section 51ABP(3)(c), to remove the ability for the minister to introduce market-concentration-based thresholds. It needs to be clear to companies when they need to notify. If, after a review of the act, it's found that the existing thresholds are not working, I think this should come back to parliament for consideration so that further complexity is not added for business without appropriate scrutiny and a weighing of the costs and benefits.
The bill also allows the Treasurer to designate high-risk parts of the economy where the ACCC will be able to review all mergers regardless of whether they meet other thresholds. This could be used for airlines, supermarkets, or any industry where there are specific competition concerns. While I support this aspect of the bill, the bill does not require the Treasurer to seek advice from the ACCC before making such a designation. I think this is a problem. ACCC consultation should be a requirement not an option. The government informs me that the ACCC is likely to be central to this process, so I see no need to allow the Treasurer to designate an industry as high risk without the advice of the ACCC.
I'm concerned that this could be used for political purposes, where a particular industry could be kicked with greater scrutiny in an effort to appease the public, rather than where there are specific and well-founded competition concerns. I'm not reassured by the government saying that the ACCC could always participate in a public consultation process. The ACCC has specific expertise and a specific role in this area, and should be consulted specifically in advance of any public consultation process. For this reason, I will propose that section 51ABQ(4) be amended to change 'may' to 'must' to ensure that the ACCC has a clear role in the designation of any high-risk parts of the economy.
I have one more concern. The merger-specific expanded definition of 'substantial lessening of the competition' is a significant change to a concept that's been the subject of decades of judicial application and reasoning. I'm still not clear why a different definition is necessary here, and I'm concerned that it may cause confusion. I'd urge the government to explain this added complexity and use any opportunity to clarify the difference in definitions.
These minor changes aside, the bill increases the transparency and scrutiny of private mergers and makes the regulation a mandatory reporting regime so that the ACCC can monitor how our business acquisitions are affecting competition. I recognise that we do need to reduce red tape so that businesses can get on with doing what they do best, particularly given our period of low productivity. I recognise that this will create a regulatory burden, particularly in the private equity sector. The coalition has pointed out some other concerns, such as ACCC resourcing and the compliance burden, and I respect that these need to be considered. But the benefits of this amendment could deliver for cost-of-living relief, and that's so important that I'm happy to support the passage of this bill, ideally with my amendments.
More competition in sectors like supermarkets, airlines, fuel and liquor should result in lower prices and more choice for consumers. We need to be more assertive in formulating law and policy to address the stronghold the duopolies and oligopolies have on Australian markets. A fit-for-purpose merger clearance process will improve the regulation of competition in Australia, in turn encouraging innovation and new entry into important sectors in Australia. The goal here is lower prices for consumers. The government must pull all levers possible to respond to the cost-of-living crisis, and ensuring better market competition is one lever to pull.
I commend this bill to the House.
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(Fenner—Assistant Minister for Competition, Charities and Treasury and Assistant Minister for Employment) (18:07): I thank those members who have contributed to the debate. The Treasury Laws Amendment (Mergers and Acquisitions Reform) Bill 2024 delivers a new, faster, stronger, simpler, more targeted and more transparent merger system that will help deliver what we all want: a stronger, more competitive and more productive economy. Our country is facing some of the most significant structural changes in our history, with increasing digitalisation, particularly artificial intelligence; the net zero transformation; and the rise of the care economy. We need to ensure workers aren't unfairly prevented from shifting to a better job. We must look after the most vulnerable.
In Australia, productivity growth has slowed and many aggregate measures of dynamism have declined. A range of competition indicators suggest an overall deterioration in competition in Australia since the early 2000s. We've seen the average market share of the largest four firms in each industry increase from 41 per cent in 2001-02 to 43 per cent in 2018-19. Average price mark-ups are estimated to have increased by around six per cent over the past two decades. A range of concentrated sectors are evident across the economy, ranging from baby food to beer. During consultation, CHOICE and the Consumer Federation of Australia highlighted adverse consumer outcomes in highly concentrated sectors: groceries, banking, telecommunications, energy and the digital economy. Farming groups raised concern about market concentration in supply chains, with limited options for buying inputs and selling products impacting their ability to sell at competitive prices.
Competition encourages innovation, puts downward pressure on prices, and leads to improved choice and quality of products and services for consumers and businesses. Merger law is a key pillar of competition policy. It plays a critical gatekeeper role in preventing anticompetitive mergers before they take place, protecting consumers and promoting competition.
Even small increases in prices resulting from anticompetitive mergers can be harmful for consumers. Analysis by the ACCC and their ex post review of Caltex's acquisition of Milemaker found that petrol prices in local areas near the Milemaker sites had increased by 0.8c per litre at the pump or around 0.5 per cent, costing motorists around $6 million every year. The need for merger reform is clear. The current ad hoc merger process is unfit for a modern economy, lagging best practice in comparable countries. Australia is one of only three OECD countries that doesn't currently require compulsory notification of mergers.
For some businesses, the current system can be too slow and cause expensive delays as they wait. We heard from the Business Council of Australia and the Tech Council that the process can also lead to considerable uncertainty and can be unpredictable. The current system relies on judicial enforcement, which can involve delays of multiple years while cases wind their way through the hierarchy of courts at considerable expense to the parties.
The current approach is also not transparent for businesses or the community. There is widespread agreement from stakeholders that increased transparency would help merger parties, other businesses and consumers to engage with ACCC merger reviews. Improved transparency will also allow the community to understand what mergers are doing to the economy.
For the ACCC itself, it has been dealing with inadequate merger notifications, insufficient information and a reactive, adversarial approach from some businesses, with limited capacity to present economic evidence in court. The voluntary nature means that merger parties can proceed to completion or threaten to complete a merger before the ACCC has finalised its review. Last year, over 1,400 mergers were recorded at a value of around $300 billion. Meanwhile, the ACCC looks at an average of 330 mergers a year. But we don't know whether these are the right 330 or the mergers with the greatest potential to cause harm. What we do know is that there are anticompetitive mergers that have escaped detection under our current system only to be found out after the fact.
In one example the ACCC became aware of a large number of acquisitions completed between 2017 and 2022 by Petstock, the second-largest speciality pet retail chain in Australia. To address concerns about the impact on national and statewide chain-on-chain competition in local areas, the ACCC accepted a court enforceable undertaking from Petstock to divest a package of sites and assets, including 41 speciality pet retail stores and 25 co-located veterinary hospitals.
In another example, Steadfast, Australia's largest Strata insurance broker, brokering around 40 per cent and writing around half of Australia's strata policies, has in just over a decade spent more than $1.6 billion in the acquisition of insurance brokers and underwriters. According to the ACCC, Steadfast has amassed a very significant market position with almost no notifications—only one in the last three years, which was very shortly before completion. The ACCC has publicly highlighted this as an example of the critical problem with the current informal, voluntary approach to merger control in Australia.
In a third example, Primary Health Care did not notify the ACCC of their acquisition of Healthscope's pathology assets, which removed a significant third player, leaving just two major full-service pathology providers in Queensland. After investigation, the ACCC accepted remedies to restore a competitive market structure in Queensland.
But addressing the effects of anticompetitive mergers after the harm has already occurred is not a good deal for consumers dealing with cost-of-living pressures or for businesses. The time and difficulty in obtaining information post completion poses challenges in ineffectively remedying the harm and restoring competition. Concerns have also been raised about potential land banking by supermarkets which may block competitors from developing sites and entering local markets.
This bill responds to those issues, bringing our merger system into the 21st century. These reforms will ensure that future acquisitions that meet the notification threshold will be subject to scrutiny, empowering the ACCC to effectively and efficiently detect and prevent anticompetitive mergers and acquisitions. The size of the benefit is substantial. Drawing on evidence from overseas, Treasury has estimated an effective merger regime may be worth between $340 million and $732 million a year to the Australian economy, while noting that the status quo settings already achieved some of this.
The gains will build over time, too, as more and more areas of the economy are saved from facing higher prices from anticompetitive mergers. If the new system stops just one additional merger that would have resulted in a five per cent price rise in a market the size of $200 million, it will save consumers $10 million a year. For context, a $200 million market is about the size of the newspaper and book retailing market in Western Australia.
Getting our merger and competition settings right will attract investment and allow startups to enter the market to challenge incumbents, promoting growth and innovation, reversing the concentration of market power in a small number of firms. The benefits from stronger competition are significant. Overall, Treasury and Reserve Bank estimates suggest Australia's GDP could be 1.3 percentage points higher if competition were restored to the same level as the 2000s. In today's dollars, that's $30 billion to $80 billion a year.
This bill introduces a mandatory and suspensory administrative system to better address anticompetitive mergers and acquisitions. It'll simplify and speed up the process for the review of mergers and acquisitions for businesses and the ACCC, give the ACCC stronger powers to identify and scrutinise transactions that pose a risk to competition and improve transparency so we're all better informed.
The new merger control system will be mandatory from 1 January 2026. Mergers above certain notification thresholds will need to be notified and approved by the ACCC as the first instance expert administrative decision-maker. Most mergers have genuine economic benefits and are an important feature of a healthy, open financial system. But some mergers can cause serious economic harm. The new system will be targeted and risk-based. Not every merger will be captured, and more resources will be devoted to addressing mergers posing the greatest risk to the economy. The thresholds will be set according to evidence of expected harm, allowing the ACCC to focus its efforts. The system will be responsive to insights from the latest evidence and economic theory as our economy rapidly changes.
Regardless of whether you think mergers are a significant economic problem or not, you should support this bill as best-practice regulation. The notification thresholds will be set through legislative instruments to ensure the system is agile, flexible and able to adapt to evolving issues in the economy. The government intends to set monetary thresholds via legislative instruments following the passage of this bill. There will be three key objective, risk based, targeted thresholds to capture economically significant acquisitions, acquisitions involving very large businesses and serial acquisitions.
We want to see the majority of mergers approved quickly so the ACCC can focus on the minority that give rise to competition concerns. Land acquisitions involving residential property development and certain commercial property acquisitions won't be included, to avoid clogging up the system with simple land purchases.
The bill also provides flexibility to allow the Treasurer to adjust and calibrate the thresholds to respond to evidence based concerns from the ACCC about high-risk mergers, such as in the supermarket sector. On the advice of the ACCC chair, the government also intends to use this power to get the competition regulator to review purchases of an interest above 20 per cent in an unlisted or private company if the monetary notification thresholds are met. This is a significant change for the ACCC, the business and the community, and it will shape the boundaries of merger control over time. These reforms will improve community awareness and understanding of merger assessments, deterring anticompetitive mergers before they are proposed.
To support the transition to the new system, businesses will be able to voluntarily notify and opt into the new system from 1 July 2025. We're also retaining the existing prohibition against anticompetitive mergers for those that are not required to be notified. The ACCC will also be able to waive the requirement to notify, to support businesses to transition to the new system with greater certainty.
There is important work that needs to be done to prepare for the start of the new system, including ensuring the ACCC has economic and data analytics toolkits that it needs ready to go. Passage of the bill this year will give business and the ACCC time to prepare, facilitating a smooth transition and enabling the system to quickly mature. To ensure the system operates as intended into the future, the thresholds will be reviewed 12 months after coming into effect, and there will be a statutory review three years from the start of the new system to evaluate its functioning and effectiveness, driven by data and evidence, designed and supported by the Australian Centre for Evaluation. To promote accountability, the ACCC will report annually on statistics and data underpinning the new scheme. The ACCC is also committed to revitalising and expanding its Performance Consultative Committee to advise on the ACCC's merger review functions as well as the broad range of the ACCC's responsibilities.
Together with the new public register and other safeguards, business and the community can be confident that these reforms will achieve better timing, certainty and transparency around decision-making. Together, these changes will meet community expectations that the ACCC can detect and stop harmful anticompetitive acquisitions, give businesses certainty and predictability and make it easier for the majority of mergers to be approved quickly.
This bill represents the biggest reform to merger settings in half a century. Greater competition is crucial for lifting dynamism, productivity and wages growth, putting downward pressure on prices and delivering more choices for Australians dealing with cost-of-living pressure. The government is committed to building a more competitive, dynamic and productive economy. This bill will help to achieve this.
Finally, I'd like to acknowledge the work of Treasurer Jim Chalmers and the contributions of the Competition Review Expert Advisory Panel, the ACCC, businesses and the broader community to the consultation and development of this bill. A range of stakeholders have expressed support for reform of Australia's approach to merger control, including business, consumer groups, small business, the agricultural sector and competition law experts. I particularly want to thank Tori Barker and Nick Terrell from my office; colleagues from the Treasurer's office; officials from the Department of the Treasury's Competition Taskforce, including Marcus Bezzi, Jason McDonald, Annalisa Heger, Natasha McNamara, Jack Elliott, Stella Leung, Jessica Kwong, Lilian Yan, Sheena Chen, Geoffrey Go, Rocky Mi and Adam Spence; and officials from Treasury's law design team—Jessica Robinson, Amy Jarvoll, David Haines, Ron Harry and Kurt Nakkan. I commend this bill to the House.
Senate Economics Legislation Committee
The Bill was referred to Senate Economics Legislation Committee on 10 October 2024.
The Committee reported on 15 November 2024, recommending passage of the Bill.
Preliminary reviews
Merger Reform (consultation paper)
20 November 2023 - 19 January 2024
Type: Consultation Paper - Competition Review (Treasury)
Merger Reform: A Faster, Stronger and Simpler System for a More Competitive Economy
10 April 2024
Type: Australian Government response to review
View Government Response
Reforming mergers and acquisitions (exposure draft bill)
24 July 2024 - 13 August 2024
Type: Exposure draft bill
Reforming mergers and acquisitions - notification thresholds
30 August 2024 - 20 September 2024
Type: Consultation Paper
Merger reform for a more competitive economy (government response)
10 October 2024
Media and commentary
Government
Jim Chalmers, Government has listened to concerns on merger law reform (AFR, 9 October 2024)
ACCC
ACCC welcomes passage of historic merger laws
29 November 2024
ACCC welcomes introduction of merger reform bill, prepares for implementation
10 October 2024
Media
Max Opray, Labor targets supermarkets in merger reforms (The Saturday Paper, 10 October 2024)
Law firms
Allens
Merger reform legislation: complex process risks capturing more transactions than intended
11 October 2024
Baker McKenzie
Australia: The final countdown as Government introduces new merger reform bill to Parliament
17 October 2024
Corrs Chambers Westgarth
Australian merger reform: proposed legislation provides much-needed clarity but regulatory over-capture remains likely
11 October 2024
Gilbert + Tobin
Australia’s merger reform odyssey: our first look at the final merger reform bill
11 October 2024
Hall&Wilcox
Australian Merger Reform update: key changes proposed by new Bill
17 October 2024
Herbert Smith Freehills
Australian Government introduces Merger Reform Bill
10 October 2024
Holding Redlich
Australian Government introduces landmark merger reform Bill
16 October 2024
King&Wood Mallesons
The eagle has landed - new merger reform bill introduced into parliament today
10 October 2024
Norton Rose Fulbright
Merger law reform in Australia: What next after the Exposure Draft?
August 2024
White & Case
Australia’s mandatory merger control legislation introduced into Parliament
17 October 2024
Last updated: 29 November 2024
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Legislation extracts sourced from ComLaw. This material is licensed for reuse under a Creative Commons CC BY-NC-SA 3.0 licence.
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Explanatory Memorandum sourced from Parliament of Australia website and reproduced pursuant to Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Australia licence.
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