Does Competition Law Have a Digital Achilles’ Heel?

Hasan Mohammad

Australian Journal of Competition and Consumer Law

Hasan Mohammad, ‘Does Competition Law Have a Digital Achilles’ Heel?’ (2022) 30(2) Australian Journal of Competition and Consumer Law 93

Abstract

While the rapid shift towards the digital economy affords a multitude of benefits, competition authorities and commentators have raised concerns regarding the risks that it poses for competition enforcement. In particular, it is widely believed that traditional competition law principles are ineffective at controlling market power in digital platform markets as they were originally developed for enforcement in non-digital contexts. This article focuses on the unique attributes of digital platforms which are thought to give rise to competition enforcement risks, namely network effects, self-preferencing, default settings, data asymmetries and strategic acquisitions. It is demonstrated that many claims regarding these attributes are not supported by empirical evidence. In addition, examples of recent competition proceedings are cited to demonstrate how traditional competition law and complementary consumer law frameworks are malleable such that they remain applicable and effective in addressing market power concerns in digital contexts.

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